The basic argument for making AI better at moral philosophy

In this post, I try to briefly make the case for making models good at moral philosophy. To be up front, aside from some niche areas of moral philosophy, I don’t actually think this is the most important thing to work on for most people. But, depending on the exact scope, I do think it’s near competitive. I also like it as an archetype for a broader set of interventions. After a brief preface (related to the archetype point), the main text of the post is structured as follows: I say what I mean by moral philosophy. I point out some directions in particular that seem relatively important and that are arguably within the scope of moral philosophy. I offer a brief explanation of what I mean by making AI systems “better” at moral philosophy. (I give a more detailed account in the appendix.) I give some examples of the kinds of interventions I have in mind. Finally, I make the actual case, arguing for importance and tractability (where tractability prices in neglectedness). I include a lengthy “appendix” with the following content: A collection of articles by other people making similar arguments Responses to some common concerns about how working on this might have bad effects on the w