LessWrongllmprompt injection3h agoenergy 130

Future of AI Honeypots

TL;DR. As AI agents get better, I expect them to recognize honeypots and avoid fingerprinting, so honeypots will have to rely on the distinctive advantages of AI, namely the combination of intelligence and speed. I also expect honeypots to rely more on real software with different levels of protection rather than on deliberately left vulnerabilities. In 2024 we detected agents with prompt injections in the style of the "important message" attack from AgentDojo, [1] placed in the SSH banner and in command outputs. [2] The injections asked for a password that needs language understanding to find (e.g., "the password is the first US president's name"), so that passing the trap became the signal of an LLM. Frontier models then started to detect the emulated Cowrie shell itself within a few seconds from basic shell features that did not work (e.g., shell arithmetic), so I moved the honeypot to a real Debian. I expect honeypot awareness will grow in the same way as evaluation awareness, and agents will notice small inconsistencies better and better, up to reasoning like "these commands have 0.6 seconds more latency, so this is likely a honeypot". [3] Prompt injection traps are also becom

read the original at LessWrong →
This source publishes only a summary in its feed, so the full article lives at the outlet. The link above and below goes to the original.